New Delhi: The Supreme Court has clarified that the use of mere swear words, profanities, and vulgar expletives, regardless of how offensive, unpalatable, or uncivil they may be, does not automatically amount to the criminal offence of obscenity. A Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi observed that vulgarity and obscenity are distinct legal concepts, and offensive language exchanged during a quarrel does not satisfy the statutory requirements of criminal obscenity.
The apex court noted that for an utterance to be legally classified as obscene under Section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), it must be shown to be lascivious, appeal to prurient interests, and have a clear tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds of those exposed to it. The Bench emphasised that while crude or abusive language may evoke feelings of anger, disgust, shock, or revulsion, it does not satisfy the threshold of obscenity unless it carries a sexually prurient or lascivious connotation.
The ruling came during the hearing of an appeal filed by a petitioner challenging a Madras High Court order, which had confirmed his conviction under Section 294(b) of the IPC. The case originated from an August 2017 agricultural land dispute in Tamil Nadu, where the prosecution alleged that the petitioner verbally abused the complainant using severe vulgar expletives and caste-based slurs before engaging in an assault. While the trial court had initially convicted the petitioner under the IPC and the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the Madras High Court later acquitted him of the SC/ST Act charges but upheld the IPC convictions.
In setting aside the obscenity conviction, the Supreme Court highlighted another vital deficiency in the prosecution’s case, noting that a mandatory ingredient of Section 294(b) is that the utterance must cause actual annoyance to others in or near a public place. The Bench observed that it was nobody’s case that the words caused public annoyance, much less to the complainant himself. While the top court set aside the convictions for obscenity and criminal intimidation under Section 506(ii), it refused to interfere with the petitioner’s conviction under Section 326 for causing grievous hurt, given the medical evidence confirming a fractured nasal bone resulting from the altercation.
